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Abstract 
The debate whether property is a limit on or the product of sovereignty envisages a tension 
between “the individual owner” and “the state.” But “the state” is not more than the aggregate of 
individuals who define theirs and others’ property rights through the state’s political process. The 
underlying tension between property and sovereignty is thus the tension between the economic 
market and the political market. Owners and others compete simultaneously at both levels to 
define, protect or improve the value of property. There are two ways to compete in the political 
marketplace: by engaging either in “high visibility politics” or in “low visibility politics.” 
Diffuse owners rely on "high visibility politics" promoted by agents such as political parties or 
trade unions and on elections, referenda and the like, whereas smaller groups of owners prefer 
the “low politics” of capturing lawmakers and state executives.  
When economic markets became global at the end of the Cold War, so did the political markets: 
property rights increasingly became defined by international agreements, by decisions of 
international organizations, and by the exercise of “low politics” in foreign, weaker states. The 
global political markets were dominated by the executive branches of a handful of relatively 
strong states that, in turn, were responsive to the “low politics” of special interests. The high 
transaction costs of cooperation among diffuse owners inhibited the parallel rise of “high 
politics” at the global level. The skewed global political market for property continues to favor 
special interests, but there are budding attempts to reclaim the space for “high politics” by 
national regulators and courts.  Current negotiations over the so-called “Mega Regional” 
agreements between the U.S. and its trading partners will, if successful, nip these buds as they 
render certain property rights almost immune to the subsequent challenges of high politics.  
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The debate whether property is a limit on or the product of sovereignty envisages a tension 
between “the individual owner” and “the state.” But “the state” is not more than the aggregate of 
individuals who define theirs and others’ property rights through the political process. Stated 
differently, then, the underlying tension between property and sovereignty is a tension between 
the citizens. The citizens operate to define and redefine their property rights through the 
economic market and the “political market.” The economic market is the arena where owners 
define their rights through unilateral action or consensual transactions. The political market is the 
venue where voters and organized interests compete over control of the state’s lawmaking and 
regulatory functions. While traditionally the political market was domestic, defined by national 
laws and institutions, it increasingly opens up to various supra- and international arenas where 
entitlements are shaped by formal and informal international public or private agreements. 
Owners compete simultaneously in both economic and political arenas to define, protect and 
improve the value of their property. 
In principle, there are two ways for owners to compete in the political marketplace: they can 
engage in what we could call, as perhaps a useful heuristic, either “high visibility politics” or 
“low visibility politics (or any combination thereof). Diffuse owners (and, of course, those who 
own nothing), for whom collective action through the economic market is impossible or costly, 
rely instead on agents such as political parties or trade unions that are active in “high visibility 
politics” (“high politics”),1 which includes elections and referenda, strikes, demonstrations and, 
ultimately, revolutions. They obtain their information from high visibility media informed by 
investigative journalism and leaks. These political agents transform demands for the definition of 
property rights (e.g., as collective vs. private), or for the redistribution of property, into political 
platforms.  
At the same time, smaller groups of owners turn their numerical disadvantage into political gain
2
 
by forming lobbies that pursue “low (visibility) politics” of capturing and otherwise cultivating 
lawmakers and state executives, steering them to refrain from intervention in the economic 
market or to intervene on their behalf in various ways (usually by a complex mix of regulation 
                                                            
1 ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957). 
2 MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965). 
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and deregulation, privatization and "publicization"). They also try to steer media reporting to 
their side by buying or putting economic pressure on media outlets. Success in low visibility 
political gains by, for example, capturing state institutions, may prove more valuable than high 
visibility gains reflected in clear laws that secure entitlements. Indeed, recent evidence in the 
sphere of foreign investment suggests that foreign investors are attracted to countries where 
property rights are poorly defined but where the expectations of the investors can be secured by 
capturing the local government.
3
 
A fair equilibrium between (and within) these two types of owners, if achieved, would be 
reinforced by clear delineation of rights that are secured by institutional checks and balances , 
such as courts, central banks and other regulators.
4
 Arguably, some developed democracies have 
managed to reach a relatively fair equilibrium during the second half of the twentieth century, a 
result of intense competition among interest groups and between them and diffuse voters.   
When economic markets became global at the end of the Cold War, so did the political markets: 
property rights increasingly became defined by international agreements, by decisions of 
international organizations, by informal government-to-government understandings, by de facto 
delegation of authority to private initiatives to set standards for markets, and by the exercise of 
“low politics” in foreign, weaker or stronger states. The global political markets were dominated 
by the executive branches of a handful of relatively strong, mainly northern states that, in turn, 
were responsive to the “low politics” of special interests. The high transaction costs of 
cooperation among diffuse and relatively less endowed owners – now including individuals from 
many countries –  has inhibited the parallel rise of “high politics” at the global level. As a result, 
the skewed global political market for property favored the special interests, mainly but not 
exclusively of richer, northern countries. 
But in what may have been a surprise to some observers, a few national legislatures and courts 
continued to serve as venues for “high politics” despite the external pressures. The 2013 
                                                            
3 See below.  
4 For an analysis of the evolution of a political system that protects property rights to curb the British King’s 
discretion and ensure stability of expectations see Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and 
Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England, 49 J. ECON. 
HIST. 803 (1989). For an explanation of the success of the economies of certain East Asian countries as grounded in 
stable expectations of owners large and small see JOSE E. CAMPOS & HILTON L. ROOT, THE KEY TO THE ASIAN 
MIRACLE: MAKING SHARED GROWTH CREDIBLE (1996).  
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judgment of the Supreme Court of India in Novartis v. India,
5
 which interpreted narrowly the 
TRIPS agreement’s scope of IP protection, exhibited the potential for offsetting the clout of the 
big multinationals by using state institutions.
6
 The European Parliament’s fateful refusal to ratify 
the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
7
 in 2012 following mass protests against that measure 
demonstrated the promise of the resurrection of “high politics” at the global level. 
However, the Novartis judgment and the European Parliament’s vote also served as triggers for 
redoubled efforts to expand the global space of “low politics.” The ongoing secret negotiations 
over the so-called “Mega Regional” agreements between the U.S. and its trading partners are set 
to redefine certain property rights and render them almost immune to the subsequent challenges 
of high politics. Such a victory for “low politics” may be not only unjust but also short-sighted. 
Instead, a stable global equilibrium between the two competing camps, reinforced by robust 
domestic and global checks and balances, is not only morally required but also in the long-term 
interest of both camps. 
The aim of this essay is to provide an overview of the intimate interaction between the two 
markets for property as they play out in the global arena. The story is obviously evolving, and 
attention must be paid to the potential impact of the “Mega Regional” agreements and the 
possible reactions to them. A full analysis of “winners” and “losers” as well as a normative 
assessment of the current property regimes is beyond the scope of this essay, although I will hint 
at certain aspects of efficiency and equity that arise and at possible institutional remedies. Part II 
provides a general overview of the processes by which voters and interest groups compete in the 
political marketplace to define their respective property rights. Part III analyzes the turn to global 
political markets and explains the systemic advantage of low politics at the global level. Part IV 
explores the emerging efforts to create venues for high politics to counter the reign of low 
politics in global markets, as well as the more recent effort to respond and silence these nascent 
initiatives. Part V concludes.  
 
                                                            
5 Novartis AG v. Union of India & Others, A.I.R 2013 S.C. 1311 (India) (available at 
http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40212). 
6 See below. 
7 Margot E. Kaminski, An Overview and the Evolution of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, 21 ALB. L.J. 
SCI. & TECH. 385 (2011).  
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II. The Globalization of the Political Markets for  Property 
(a) Overview 
The struggle for the definition of property rights takes place simultaneously in the economic and 
the political marketplaces. Saul Levmore has pointed out that the definition of property rights 
may result from specific distributions of transaction costs (what I term here the economic 
market) or from interest-group influence (the political market).
8
 Usually, the process of 
definition will not be a story of “either-or,” as both the economic and the political markets would 
have a simultaneous or sequential effect on the right. The economic markets reflect scarcity and 
transaction costs and these shape the capabilities and incentives of individuals and groups to 
assert rules that exclude nonusers and overcome challenges of resource management – think 
about the farmers in Shasta County, the “Robber Barons” who appropriated the Rhine, or Google 
and other Big Data storage corporations who regard the data they store as exclusively theirs.
9
 
These rules – efficient, egalitarian, or neither – may or may not be reflected – bottom-up – in 
formal state law.
10
 At the same time property rights are also shaped top-down by the political 
process.
11
 The political market will not be influenced only by interest groups, as voting rules also 
tend to have a significant impact on outcomes,
12
 and – to the extent that one is willing to concede 
that sometimes deliberations are effective – diffuse voters might also have a say in the definition 
of rights.  
 
As suggested above, there are two ways for owners to compete in the political marketplace for 
defining their property rights: they can engage in “high visibility politics” or in “low visibility 
                                                            
8 Saul Levmore, Two Stories About the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S421 (2002); See also 
Daniel Fitzpatrick, Evolution and Chaos in Property Rights Systems: The Third World Tragedy of Contested Access, 
115 YALE L.J. 996 (2006); Stuart Banner, Transitions between Property Regimes, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S359 (2002). 
9 Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL 
STUD. S453 (2002); Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 
347 (1967); Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); Louis L. Jaffe, Law Making by 
Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV. 212 (1937); Omri Yadlin, A Public Choice Approach to Private Ordering, 98 
MICH. L. REV. 2620 (2000). See also GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTIES OF PROPERTY 
(2012) (at chapter 11). 
10 ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991); ELINOR OSTROM, 
GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTES FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990). 
11 Katrina Miriam Wyman, From Fur to Fish: Reconsidering the Evolution of Private Property, 80(1) N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 117 (2006); See also ITAI SENED, THE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS OF PRIVATE PROPERTY 76 (1997). 
12 Wyman, supra note 11. 
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politics” (or any combination thereof). Diffuse owners, for whom collective action through the 
economic market is costly, rely instead on agents such as political parties or trade unions that are 
active in “high politics”: elections and referenda, strikes, demonstrations and, ultimately, 
revolutions.
13
 Smaller groups of owners, for whom cooperation is feasible, prefer high politics 
only if capture is not an available option or if it is an option they all commit to shun. For 
example, instead of futile attempts to influence an unresponsive king, competitors would insist 
on delimiting the king’s discretion, as the wealthy Englishmen have done after the Glorious 
Revolution.
14
 But otherwise, smaller groups would tend to pursue the “low politics” of capturing 
lawmakers and state executives. Small groups may also try to shape public opinion by supporting 
candidates' campaigns or by buying influence in media outlets,
15
 but this “high politics” 
intervention (always indirect and unacknowledged) will be used to help their agents get the votes 
they need for reelection, not to influence the choice made by these agents.
16
  
Often private ownership provides not only the incentive but also the ability to overcome 
collective action costs and form interest groups. George Stigler has exposed the ways the interest 
group of railroad companies used state authority to preempt competition from truck drivers.
17
 
What Carl Reich optimistically called “New Property”18 was exposed by Stigler as a means of 
intervening in the “Old Property” market by enclosing commons, creating entry barriers, etc. 
Mancur Olson’s theory of collective action19 provided the explanation why Stigler’s findings 
could be generalized: smaller groups are more likely to succeed through “low politics” to shape 
public policies at the expense of the larger groups with their “high politics” methods. Olson 
explained and Stigler proved that the underlying concern of the U.S. Constitution, that the 
minority of property owners must be protected from the landless masses,
20
 wasn’t real: the use of 
                                                            
13 On informational asymmetries and the consequential reliance on agents such as political leaders, see Downs, 
supra note 2. 
14 North and Weingast, supra note 5 (discussing the effects of the redesigned political institutions after the Glorious 
Revolution on the improved security of property rights and the emergence of private capital markets). 
15 Citizens United v. Federal Election Committee, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
16 Cf. Stein Rokkan, Norway: Numerical Democracy and Corporate Pluralism, in POLITICAL OPPOSITION IN 
WESTERN DEMOCRACIES, 70, 106 (Robert Dahl Ed., 1966) (“votes count in the choice of governing personnel, but 
other resources decide the actual policies pursued by authorities.”). 
17 George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 1 BELL J. ECON. MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971). 
18 Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). 
19 Olson, supra note 3. 
20 Landowners were particularly concerned that a landless majority would use its numerical superiority to 
redistribute property. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (discussing property ownership as a basis for 
conflict of interests among voters and legislators). The installation of a complex and diversified system of 
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“high politics” to limit the small group of property owners is an inherently limited strategy 
because political agents are susceptible to the property owners' capture efforts. 
As Mancur Olson elaborates in The Rise and Decline of Nations,
21
 because smaller groups could 
organize themselves more quickly than their opponents within the nascent Westphalian system of 
sovereign states, they were able to use the state as the instrument for obtaining a disproportionate 
share of the domestic resources. But in robust democracies, rival political parties exert constant 
pressure to level the political playing field and check the influence of special interests. If 
successful, a fair equilibrium between these two camps of owners, as well as an equilibrium 
within the two camps (e.g., between the city and the countryside, between truck and railroad 
companies
22
 or between importers and exporters), will be achieved. This equilibrium will be 
reinforced by state institutions that provide for robust checks on voters and bureaucrats, such as 
courts, central banks and other regulators, and by norms that on the one hand define property 
rights in a relatively clear manner
23
 and impose effective limits on takings, and on the other hand 
provide for transparency and participation in public decision-making and otherwise subject the 
discretion of public authorities to judicial review.
24
 The battle of high politics vs. low politics 
will then focus on the extent to which such regulators are insulated from the influence of low 
politics. 
Obviously, if sufficiently independent, courts, central bankers and other regulators could become 
themselves effective players in the political-legal struggle to shape property rights. Removed 
from the often skewed political battle, these regulators are quite likely to reach outcomes that are 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
government, supermajority amendment requirements, and judicial review to protect constitutional rights such as the 
right to property responded to such concerns. See id.; THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (Alexander Hamilton or James 
Madison) (discussing the political structures for curbing such conflict of interests). 
21 MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS Chapter 3 (1982). 
22 Stigler, supra note 18. 
23 On the link between the clear definition of property rights and protection of poor owners against “land grabs,” see 
Rabah Arezki, Klaus Deininger & Harris Selod, What drives the global land rush? (IMF Working Paper Working 
Paper No. 11/251, 2011), available at http://www.cepii.fr/institutions/doc/2011_Arezki_et_al.pdf.  
24 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 
J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975) (presenting constitutional guarantees as securing legislative deals among diverse interest 
groups); See Donald J. Boudreaux & A. C. Pritchard, Reassessing the Role of the Independent Judiciary in 
Enforcing Interest-Group Bargains, 5 CONST. POL, ECON. 1 (1994).  
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both fair and efficient, or at least ensure sincere and inclusive public deliberation that can lead to 
such outcomes.
25
   
 
(b) The Political Market Goes Global 
 
As much as the smaller groups used the state as an instrument for obtaining a disproportionate 
share of the domestic resources, they also embraced the state as a tool for expanding their wealth 
in foreign markets. The state apparatus has offered cover for entrepreneurs operating beyond 
state borders. The widely accepted constitutional doctrine, that the state executive has the sole 
authority to engage in international relations, was a boon to small groups whose success was tied 
to “low politics” because of the relative opaqueness of executive action and the dearth of 
effective checks on “foreign affairs” compared to legislation. By influencing the global activities 
of their or other states’ executives, special interests could shape the political markets of many if 
not most states. 
One arena traditionally used by small groups seeking to define property rights has been 
international law and its typical tools – treaties and decisions of international institutions. In fact, 
the very first international organization was set up in 1804 to demolish the property rights of the 
Robber Barons over navigation on the Rhine,
26
 and one of the first instances of a prohibition 
derived from international law was the abolition of the slave trade which resulted from a British 
policy motivated by a combination of “high politics” and the decreasing benefits of this trade to 
                                                            
25 Hanoch Dagan, Judges and Property, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 17, 35-39 
(Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2015) (emphasizing adjudication as enjoying, at times, “a significant comparative 
advantage” in defining property rights. At p.39 Dagan writes: “If most or many property matters are either 
politically marginal or dominated by interest groups, the legislators’ expected responsiveness is likely to be rather 
limited.”). For the opposite view, see Avihay Dorfman, Property and Collective Undertaking: The Principle of 
Numerus Clausus, 61 U. TORONTO L.J. 467, 510–13 (2011)). 
26 The treaty instituted a single toll levied by a joint administration controlled by the French government and by the 
arch-chancellor of the German Empire. This first IGO had the responsibility to use the proceeds of the toll to 
improve navigability and the state of the towpaths, as well as to settle disputes with the various cities and princes 
along the river for having lost their right to impose levies. Dale S. Collinson, The Rhine Regime in Transition - 
Relations between the European communities and the Central Commission for Rhine Navigation, 72 COLUM. L. 
REV. 485 (1972); JOSEPH PERKINS CHAMBERLAIN, THE REGIME OF THE INTERNATIONAL RIVERS: DANUBE AND 






 It is not surprising that international law itself (the way it is made and 
interpreted), shaped primarily by state executives, has come to reflect and enhance the “low 
politics” of special interests who use it to gain ground in national regulatory processes. As I have 
argued elsewhere, “Smaller groups have been successful in influencing international negotiations 
and international law since the very inception of the Westphalian order of sovereign states.”28 
Treaties are negotiated by state executives and the other political branches have only limited 
means and insufficient information to intervene. Once ratified, the treaties bind future 
generations of voters without the ability to unilaterally terminate the treaty. The interpretation of 
the treaty is usually a matter for the executive, and escape clauses in the treaty text ensure 
convenient exit options for interest groups.
29
  
International law has always reflected the interests of the developed world, in particular in the 
context of protecting the property of foreign owners. It is international law that is responsible for 
the invention of the corporation that on the one hand is independent of its foreign parent 
company,
30
  but at the same time is recognized as owned by the foreign company and hence 
immune from taking by the state of incorporation (or otherwise whose expropriation entitles the 
owner to prompt, adequate and effective compensation).
31
 Moreover, if operated from a third 
country, the tax laws of both host state and the parent’s company’s home state will not apply, 
and the entire operation could thus benefit from “tax havens.” This ingenious legal invention 
perhaps no less momentous for global business than the very invention of the company. The 
obligation to accord foreign investments “fair and equitable treatment” has become a keyword 
for imposing an increasingly demanding set of standards on host states by privatized dispute 
resolution mechanisms that were set up to insulate foreign investors from the national courts of 
                                                            
27 On the high politics in Britain at the time, see ADAM HOCHSCHILD, BURY THE CHAINS: THE BRITISH STRUGGLE TO 
ABOLISH SLAVERY (2005); on the use of international law to enforce the ban, see JENNY S. MARTINEZ, THE SLAVE 
TRADE AND THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2012). 
28 Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age of Globalization, 98 MICH. L. REV. 167 (1999). 
29 GEORGE W. DOWNS & DAVID M. ROCKE, OPTIMAL IMPERFECTION? (1995). 
30 See Ronen Palan  “Tax Havens and the Commercialization of State Sovereignty” 56 International Organization, 
151, 168-169 (2002). 
31 This wording (in relation to lawful expropriation) is known as the “Hull formula,” named after the American 
Secretary of State who declared in 1938 that Mexico is obligated to pay compensation for expropriation for any 
reason whatsoever: “[U]nder every rule of law and equity, no government is entitled to expropriate private property, 
for whatever purpose without provision for prompt, adequate and effective payment therefor.” GREEN HAYEOOD 





 The efforts of developing countries to transform talking shops such as the 
General Assembly of the United Nations into “high politics” fora, in order to press for a shift in 
foreign property protection by promoting a so-called “New International Economic Order,” 
failed miserably and ended once the Soviet bloc disintegrated.
33
  
When economic markets became global at the end of the Cold War, property rights increasingly 
became defined by international agreements and by decisions of international organizations. 
International law has become a tool to discipline the majority of states to conform to global 
standards on various aspects of property definition and use (e.g., pollution and use of natural 
resources, IP rights). Perhaps because the traditional tools of international law have become too 
public for some, and hence subject to the muster of “high politics” or parliamentary ratification, 
governments of powerful states have begun to turn to informal cooperation through “networks” 
of state executives, or to de facto delegation of standard-setting functions to private actors.
34
 The 
global political markets of today are dominated by the executive branches of a small subset of 
relatively strong states that, in turn, have been responsive to the “low politics” of special interests 
and opaque to “high politics.” And no surprise, the standards set by these informal networks 
reflect the interests of the powerful states.
35
 
One example of the success of small groups in the global political arena is the struggle to define 
the global protection of IP rights. Margot Kaminski is among the scholars who have been 
monitoring the ways in which the U.S. has “aggressively shifted among various international law 
and policy-making forums to promote a goal of harmonizing the world’s intellectual property 
laws in its image.”36 The effort began with the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
in 1995. The WTO consisted of the old GATT regime and the new General Agreement on Trade 
                                                            
32  Julie A. Maupin, Public and Private in International Investment Law: an Integrated Systems Approach, 54(2) 
VIRGINIA J. INT’L L. 367 (2014); Lise Johnson & Oleksandr Volkov, Investor-State Contracts, Home-State 
”Commitments” and the Myth of Stability in International Law, 24(3) AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 361 (2013);  Robert 
Stumberg, Sovereignty by Subtraction: The Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 31 CORNELL INT’L L.J 491 
(1998); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Investment Agreements and International Law, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 123 
(2003). 
33 Stumberg & Lowenfeld, supra note # ; Doreen Lustig’s paper (forthcoming 2016).  
34 EYAL BENVENISTI, THE LAW OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, Chapter 2 (2014). 
35 For example, in antitrust policies see Eleanor Fox, Antitrust Without Borders: From Roots to Codes to Networks, 
in COOPERATION, COMITY AND COMPETITION POLICY (Andrew T. Guzman ed.,2010), Tristan Feunteun, Cartels and 
the Right to Food: An Analysis of States’ Duties and Options, 18 J. INT’L ECON. L. 341, 368 (2015). 
36 Sean M. Flynn, Brook Baker, Margot Kaminski, and Jimmy Koo, The U.S. Proposal for an Intellectual Property 
Chapter in the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, 28 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 105 (2012). 
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in Services, and the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). The 
commitment to protect IP rights globally was imposed by the U.S. and the EU by making the 
future of trade liberalization conditional on that.
37
 But legislatures and courts in the developing 
world have interpreted their obligations narrowly,
38
 and IP owners sought to enhance their rights 
even further. As multilateral negotiations over updating the WTO accords failed, the U.S. moved 
to bilateral free trade area (FTA) agreements, to an Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (which 
was defeated by the EU Parliament that refused to ratify it),
39
 and most recently to secretive 
negotiations over “Mega-Regional” agreements with the EU and with several Pacific Rim 
countries.
40
 If these negotiations succeed they will set new global standards for IP protection that 
will have significant negative ramifications for the access to drugs.
41
  
Another strategy of certain actors has been to evade the global political markets altogether, or 
rather to have the sovereigns delegate regulatory functions to private actors or endorse practical 
immunity for markets through deregulation and privatization. Multinational corporations 
(MNCs) break up the production chain into different links that occur in different localities, 
taking advantage of the free movement of capital and operations; thus, they can not only benefit 
from different standards of production, but also shape those standards and impose them on host 
governments vying for foreign money.
42
 
Furthermore, interest groups have begun to directly exercise “low politics” in foreign, weaker 
states.
43
 Their influence is felt in key areas such as international taxation (e.g., bilateral tax 
                                                            
37 Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints, 98 
AM. J. INT’L L. 247 (2004); Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining 
and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, 56 INT’L ORG. 339 (2002); Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire’s 
New Clothes: Political Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law, 60 STAN. L. REV. 595 (2007). 
38 See the Indian Supreme Court judgment in Novartis v. The State of India, supra note 6. 
39 Kaminski, supra note 8. . 
40 Christopher Ingraham & Howard Schneider, Industry Voices Dominate the Trade Advisory System, WASHINGTON 
POST, Feb. 27, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/business/trade-advisory-committees/. 
41 Eyal Benvenisti, Democracy Captured: The Mega-Regional Agreements 23 CONSTELLATIONS 58 (2016). 
42 For an overview of these developments, see Dan Danielsen, How Corporations Govern: Taking Corporate Power 
Seriously in Transnational Regulation and Governance, 46 HARV. INT’L L. J. 411 (2005); Gerald F. Davis, Marina 
V.N. Whitman & Mayer Nathan Zald, The Responsibility Paradox: Multinational Firms and Global Corporate 
Social Responsibility (Ross Sch. of Bus. Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 1031, Apr. 2006). For a critical 
discussion, see Doreen Lustig & Eyal Benvenisti, The Multinational Corporation as “the Good Despot”: The 
Democratic Costs of Privatization in Global Settings, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 125 (2014). 
43 Recently: Stavros Gadinis, Three Pathways to Global Standards: Private, Regulator, and Ministry Networks, 109 
AM, J. INT’L L. 1 (2015). 
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treaties that ensure that the host states do not tax the foreign investors),
44
 foreign investment law 
(and specifically, bilateral investment treaties that secure foreign investment from host state 
control),
45
 and most recently in the so-called “land-grabbing” phenomenon, the long-term lease 
of vast tracts of land for cultivation.
46
 For the latter they have sought out states with a poor 
definition of property rights and weak land governance systems as their choice for investment.
47
 
While this comes as a surprise to economists who assumed that stronger property rights regimes 
would attract investors,
48
 the foreign investors apparently rely on their domination of the political 
market as the framework for protecting their investments.  
Finally, the contemporary global legal arena is also conspicuous for the areas that remain 
intentionally unregulated. For instance, there are still no effective global regimes – formal or 
informal – that can overcome global tax competition and tax havens,49 to assign state 
responsibility for acts or omissions of locally registered corporations that operate beyond the 
national jurisdiction,
50
 or to resolve sovereign defaults in ways that provide equitable burden 




                                                            
44 Tsilly Dagan, The Tax Treaties Myth, 32(4) N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 939 (2000); Kim Brooks & Richard Krever, 
The Troubling Role of Tax Treaties, 51 TAX DESIGN ISSUES WORLDWIDE, SERIES ON INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 
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III. Analysis: The Systemic Advantage of Low Politics at the Global Level 
Why are smaller groups able to exploit the global political markets through low politics even 
more than the domestic market? The answer in short is that the inherent collective action 
problems of consolidating political power have become increasingly more challenging for 
diffuse groups to resolve, while at the same time small groups found it increasingly profitable to 
overcome their impediments to cooperation. The process of globalization, which increases the 
dependency of most states on a small set of foreign actors, gives us at least four reasons to worry 
about the deterioration of the effectiveness of “high politics” by which citizens can exercise 
agency and control their political branches (beyond the traditional worries about the internal 
systemic problems of democracy).   
First, the continuous lowering of the technical and legal barriers to the free movement of people, 
goods, services, and capital across territorial boundaries has exacerbated the well-known failures 
inherent to domestic democratic processes. This process has operated to strengthen the hand of 
those domestic actors who could benefit from the increased availability of “exit” options from 
the state; for example, by relocating themselves or their investments, which are options that 
globalization offers. The threatened “exit” by these actors has increased their “voice” at the 
expense of the diffuse majority.
52
 The end of the Cold War also meant the end of external threats 
to national sovereignty and internal threats of popular insurrection, two concerns that had led 
leaders in some countries to create "a broad social base that identified its economic interests with 
the success of the regime."
53
 Those leaders felt less need to cater for the interests of diffuse 
voters when those threats faded and the alternative to market economy has been dealt such a 
decisive blow.  
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A second, related, challenge that globalization poses for the efficacy of high politics within many 
states springs from the proliferation of small and medium-size states that face increasing 
competition over access to foreign investment and foreign markets. Divided by political 
boundaries and high levels of political, social, and economic heterogeneity, these states often 
find it difficult to forge cooperation instead of competing for the foreign investment or a foreign 
state’s influence. This often makes it relatively easy for a strong economic or political actor—be 
it a powerful state or a wealthy investor—to practice “divide and rule” strategies against them.54 
These strategies further erode the capacity of weak sovereigns for collective action and 
effectively confine them to different “‘cells” in a maze of prisoners’ dilemmas (or a large, global, 
prison).  
A third challenge to the viability of high politics within national boundaries stems from the lack 
of congruence between the population of enfranchised voters and the population of parties 
affected by the voters’ decisions. The basic assumption of state democracy—that there is a 
strong overlap between these two populations—might have been correct in a world of “separate 
mansions,” when territorial boundaries defined not only the persons entitled to vote but also the 
community that was primarily affected by the choices made. Today, however, this condition is 
rarely met, and the consequences manifest themselves in two negative ways. First, voters in one 
country define rights that have spillover effects (e.g., permitting unabated pollution or imposing 
cap and trade emission regimes that are enforced also on foreigners)
55
 beyond their states without 
the affected stakeholders having the opportunity to participate in the vote or to otherwise 
influence the decisions that are taken.
56
 Second, foreign actors increasingly employ economic 
leverage to influence both candidates and domestic public opinion in other states.
57
 This 
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phenomenon may distort the domestic democratic process in the target states and disenfranchise 
their citizens. 
Fourth, the rise of global commons problems (global terrorism, climate change) requires 
collective responses through regional and international organizations, and this increases the 
demand for international governance that further reduces the space for national discretion. 
Consequentially, there is a proliferation of global venues for regulation which are dominated by 
the executive branches of a small number of powerful states and remain largely inaccessible and 
quite opaque to most voters, while enabling better-organized and better-funded groups to exploit 
asymmetric information about the goals and consequences of regulation. Many International 
organizations have functioned to further disempower diffuse domestic electorates by expanding 
the executive power of powerful states, especially through “fragmentation”: the setting up of 
multiple regulatory organizations, each with a narrow scope of authority, that prevent smaller 
and developing states from engaging in the logrolling that is necessary for them to bargain more 
effectively with the more powerful states.
58
  
While these developments render cooperation among diffuse voters across political boundaries 
through state legislatures and courts almost improbable, they at the same time enfranchise small 
groups that concentrate their efforts on the executive branches, especially on those of the more 
powerful states. Faced with the inherent weakness of the legislative and the judicial branches to 
reach out to their peers in other countries or to second-guess their respective executive in 
external affairs, as well as the precarious global standing of most states, the promise of domestic 
checks and balances as a means of disciplining the executive and protecting property rights 
through high politics has been subjected to serious pressure. 
There are plenty of examples not only of the loss of voice and the shrinking effectiveness of 
domestic checks, but also of the intention to affect these consequences: state and private actors 
create global arenas for action that will be immune to review by others and secure their 
unfettered discretion. Examples range from the use of formal international institutions such as 
the UN Security Council to create a regime of “targeted sanctions” against suspected supporters 
of global terrorism (which seeks to overcome national constitutions that protect individual rights 
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and provide for due process), through informal clubs of powerful states that set standards that all 
others have no choice but to adopt (e.g., anti-money laundering rules set and enforced by the 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF)), to private actors that set standards (e.g., on food safety, on 
labor) that are beyond challenge by a single country or even a group of them (and not subject to 
WTO discipline due to their private nature).
59
 The scandals involving FIFA’s World Cup and 
other sports events
60
 demonstrate how private bodies that exercise essentially public functions 
and impact the lives and careers of players can remain completely immune to calls for 
accountability while imposing nonnegotiable demands on member states.  
 
IV. The Rise of Global High Politics?  
(a) Sovereign Reassertion of High Politics 
Despite the structural elements that strengthen the hand of “low politics” in our time, we have 
recently been witnessing an effort to reassert the authority of “high politics” at the state level and 
thereby influence the global political market. As we saw in the IP norm-setting example, there 
are still venues of high visibility politics that can be intermittently effective. Motivated by 
justice, parochialism or greed, a number of national legislatures and courts have succeeded in 
serving as venues for “high politics” despite the external pressures.61 The 2013 judgment of the 
Supreme Court of India in Novartis v. India,
62
 which interpreted narrowly the TRIPS 
agreement’s scope of IP protection, exhibited the potential for offsetting the clout of the big 
multinationals by using state institutions.
63
 This case “caused a stir, almost in the form of a 
‘tsunami’ among intellectual property practitioners, both nationally and internationally,”64 and 
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provided a model for other national courts to emulate.
65
 Indeed, recent evidence suggests that 
national courts have become aware of the challenges that global low politics poses for their 
domestic high politics and that they have begun to develop tools to respond to them. In 
particular, they have exhibited a newfound willingness to intervene in policymaking at the global 
level and to curb the domestic enforcement of such policies, a trend that holds out the promise of 
reducing excessive executive discretion and pressure from private companies and of improving 
domestic accountability. In addition, national courts, primarily of developed democracies, being 
able to coordinate their judgments with their peers in other countries, have shown some tentative 
willingness to exploit their considerable independence from their respective executive branches 
to address review deficits at the international level and to determine which of the often 
conflicting international legal standards can be applied within their jurisdictions.
66
  
There is nothing inherently “good” in the motivation behind such reactions. Ultimately, the 
motivations for counter-reactions could be anticompetitive, myopic and self-serving. Yet what is 
inherently good in these reactions is that they generate information that fuels public deliberation. 
They open the door for public contestation which can be the key to sincere and inclusive public 
deliberation that would lead to more fair and efficient outcomes.   
  
(b) Counter-Reactions: Contemporary Efforts to Insulate Global Private Markets from High 
Politics 
But the Novartis judgment and other judgments, as well as the European Parliament’s rejection 
of the Anti-Counterfeiting Treaty,
67
 were one of the triggers for the redoubled efforts of “low 
politics,” adding to the motivation of pharmaceutical companies to offer privatized dispute 
resolution mechanisms as an alternative to national courts to prevent the Novartis precedent from 
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spreading around the developing world.
68
 The ongoing secret negotiations over the so-called 
“Mega Regional” agreements between the U.S. and its trading partners are set to redefine certain 
property rights and render them almost immune to the subsequent challenges of high politics.  
The negotiations over the “Mega Regional” agreements are being conducted simultaneously: the 
U.S. is negotiating with the EU over the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), 
and with eleven other Pacific Rim states over the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).
69
 The TTIP 
and the TPP are not only about trade. While the negotiating parties are seeking to liberalize trade 
beyond the WTO framework, they also aim at harmonizing regulation, customs and e-commerce, 
at setting standards for labor and environmental protection, for protecting foreign investments, 
government procurement, for medical devices, professional services, pesticides, information and 
communication technology, pharmaceuticals, textiles, vehicles, sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures and technical barriers to trade, enhanced protection of intellectual property, limits to 
state owned enterprises,
70
 and, in general, as U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden candidly said, “to 
help shape the character of the global economy,”71 or as the U.S. President put it even more 
starkly when he stated that these “strong, high-standards trade agreements… are vital to … 
establishing rules for the global economy that help our businesses grow and hire.”72 
What are striking about these two efforts are their secrecy and their contents: they epitomize the 
effort to secure the primacy of low politics by low politics. In other words, the aim is to evade 
public scrutiny of the process of defining global norms and creating norms and procedures that 
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ensure the control of low politics by insulating decision-making and adjudication of disputes 
concerning property rights from the influence of high politics. The opaque negotiation processes 
– key elements of the emerging regime are being publicized through Wikileaks – are intent on 
undercutting the legislative and judicial branches: both agreements seek to secure for state 
executives the exclusive control of the interpretation of the agreements, and to relegate dispute 




(c) A Budding Counter-Counter-Reaction? 
It is not impossible to envision the emergence of a high-politics reaction at the global level, for 
example by courts in TPP and TTIP countries that may insist on maintaining or recreating 
democratic safeguards. The recent history of judicial resistance to UN Security Council-led 
measures against terrorism,
74
 or the reactions in courts of developing countries to economic 
pressures of foreign actors – dramatically illustrated in the Novartis v. India case – demonstrate 
the surprising resilience and ingenuity of national bodies. A less plausible but not unthinkable 
venue of resistance might be grounded in parliamentarian refusal to ratify the agreements or 
incorporate their provisions into national law. The example shown by the Indian Parliament’s 
narrow interpretation of the TRIPS agreement, which was subsequently endorsed by the Indian 
Supreme Court in the Novartis judgment, or the example of the European Parliament’s rejection 
of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, may lead the way for other legislatures to impose 
limits on administrative discretion. 
Such reactions could be bolstered by emerging global communities of stakeholders, individuals 
and activists who rely on the Web to coordinate activities in the global economic markets 
(grassroots campaigns of boycotting or shaming) and the political markets (influencing 
lawmakers to regain control over state political markets). The competition will probably continue 
as ever before.  
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The aim of this essay was to outline the intricate relations between the economic and the political 
markets for property as they play out in the global arena. The story is continuously evolving, 
With globalization, “the state” is no longer the sole, nor even the most important arena where 
property rights are defined and regulated. But despite the proliferation of arenas, the state has 
remained and probably will remain a key venue for mediating pressures of domestic and foreign 
actors, between diffuse and concentrated owners, between high and low politics. What remains 
to be seen is whether a constellation will emerge by means of which the political competition 
between the diffuse and the concentrated owners levels the playing field, thereby promoting 
property rights regimes that are more stable, fair and efficient than what we have now. 
